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HARD BARGAINING UNDER § 2(f) OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
ROBERT M. KLEIN*
While § 2(f) 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibiting the inducement
or receipt of a proscribed discrimination in price, has been a part of the
Act since its passage in 1936, its enforcement by the Federal Trade Com-
mission has been sparing2 and its invocation by private parties infrequent.3
From an administrative point of view, however, there are indications that
a change in enforcement policy may be forthcoming. Outlining Federal
Trade Commission policy in a 1970 appearance before the Committee on
Small Business, Caspar Weinberger, then Federal Trade Commission
Chairman, stated: "We think that the greatest return will probably be ob-
tained by concentrating on inducement of anticompetitive discrimination."4
Thus, while users spurred by pressures to control costs (the current
wage-price freeze notwithstanding) may discover that aggressive bargain-
ing may yield better prices from producers anxious to improve on disap-
pointing sales of the last two years, it may also bring about heretofore
unexperienced § 2(f) problems. Case law has produced little in the way
of guidelines. This article therefore is intended to offer insight and coun-
sel to enable purchasers to remain in the channel of sanctioned aggressive
bargaining and avoid courses of conduct which will invite § 2(f) litiga-
tion.
Authoritative interpretation of § 2(f) was first undertaken by the Su-
preme Court in 1953 in Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC.' The
issue which the Supreme Court considered to be before it was procedural
in nature and in the Court's words was "simply the burden of coming
forward with evidence under § 2(f) of the Act."16  However, as a "neces-
* Member of the Michigan Bar.
1 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1964). This section provides:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohib-
ited by this section.
2 In 35 years, the Federal Trade Commission has filed less than 50 complaints.
3 Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. J. R. Simplot, Inc., 1969 Trade Cas. 5 72,975 at 87,816 (9th
Cir. 1969); Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952); American Coopera-
tive Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1946); Metropolitan Dry Clean-
ing Machinery Co., Inc. v. Mashtex Machinery Corp., 1969 Trade Cas. 5 72,686 at 86,438
(E.D.N.Y. 1969); Big Value Stamp Co. v. Sperry and Hutchison Co., 1967 Trade Cas. 5
71,978 at 83,459 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230,
237 (D.N.J. 1956).
4 Hearings on Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act Before The Special Subcom-
mittee on Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of the House Select Committee on
Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. Vol. 2 at 831 (1970); see also The Federal Trade Commis-
sion of the 1970's, 39 A.B.A. ANTTRUsT LJ. 411, 422 (1970); Beatrice Foods Co. [1967-70
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,945 at 21,286 (1969); In re Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., Inc., FTC Doc. No. 8866, Oct. 18, 1971.
5346 U.S. 61 (1953).
O ld. at 65.
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sary preliminary" to deciding the "precise issue"7 the Court undertook to
analyze the substantive prohibition of § 2(f) against the knowing receipt
of illegal discrimination in price.
In the proceedings before the Commission, the Commission staff dem-
onstrated that Automatic Canteen had secured prices as much as one-third
below those obtained by its rivals. Based on this showing, the Commis-
sion held that the buyer knowingly received a favorable concession which
was sufficiently sizeable to cause "injurious" market effects and therefore
a prima fade § 2(f) violation was established which the buyer was then
obligated to disprove as either being "non injurious, or otherwise justi-
fied."" The Court rejected this construction, which would have required
the buyer to prove the legality of the price obtained, holding that the
obligation of going forward with the evidence should be measured under
a more flexible standard of "fairness" and convenience. 9 Measured by
this standard, the burden of going forward with evidence relating to costs
was regarded by the Court as the obligation of the party plaintiff and the
burden of going forward with evidence that the seller's price was made
to meet the equally low price of a competitor as the obligation of the buyer.
Commenting on the Court's reasoning, the Report of the Attorney General's
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws stated:
But the Court realized that a buyer charged with accepting a favorable dif-
ferential could not ordinarily be expected to possess information of the
seller's cost data adequate to negativing possible illegality through a "cost
justification" of the seller's price. Rather, the Court coined a rule of "con-•
venience" and fairness by which the production of evidence as to cost sav-
ings, wherever appropriate as an element in the buyer's illegality, became
the task of the Commission which was obviously better equipped than the
buyer for investigating his supplier's book of account. 10
With respect to costs the Court in Automatic Canteen outlined in some
detail situations in which the buyer should reasonably be aware that the
seller's price is below that which can be justified:"
7 Id. at 74.
8 46 FTC 861, 896 (1950).
9Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 81 (1953).
10 THE ATrONY GENERAL's NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS,
pt. IV, at 194-95 (1955).
1 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). This section provides:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different pur-
chasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases
involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for
use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the Dis-
trict of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the
United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the
benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That
nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for
1971]
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Proof of a cost justification being what it is, too often no one can as-
certain whether a price is cost-justified. But trade experience in a particular
situation can afford a sufficient degree of knowledge to provide a basis for
prosecution. By way of example, a buyer who knows that he buys in the
same quantities as his competitor and is served by the seller in the same
manner or with the same amount of exertion as the other buyer can fairly
be charged with notice that a substantial price differential cannot be justi-
fied. The Commission need only show, -to establish its prima fade case,
that the buyer knew that the methods by which he was served and quantities
-in which he purchased were the same as in the case of his competitor. If
the methods or quantities differ, the Commission must only show that such
differences could not give rise to sufficient savings in the cost of manufac-
ture, sale or delivery to justify the price differential, and that the buyer,
knowing these were the only differences, should have known that they could
not give rise to sufficient cost savings. The showing of knowledge, of
course, will depend to some extent on the size of the discrepancy between
cost differential and price differential, so that the two questions are not iso-
lated. A showing that the cost differences are very small compared with the
price differential and could not reasonably have been thought to justify the
price difference should be sufficient.12
The circumstances from which culpable knowledge may be inferred
were expanded in a series of cases involving group buying arrangements
in the automotive parts industry. In American Motor Specialties Co. v.
FTC,'8 the system of volume discounts granted to groups of distributors
who pooled the individual purchases of their members was alleged to
permit group members to receive discriminatory prices to the competitive
disadvantage of nonmembers. The Second Circuit discussed the buyer's
position in these terms:
Petitioners of course knew that they, as individual firms, were receiving
goods in the same quantities and were served by sellers in the same man-
ner as their competitors, and hence organized themselves into a buying
group in order to obtain lower prices than their unorganized competitors.
Hence, by the very fact of having combined into a group and having ob-
tained thereby a favorable price differential, they each, under Automatic
Canteen, were charged with notice that this price differential they each en-
joyed could not be justified. And this knowledge of each of the seventeen
individual firms is imputable to the organization of which they were all
members. Thus, irrespective of whether the buying . . . constituted an
improper inducement under Section 2(f), we hold that the Commission
introduced sufficient evidence to fulfill the requirements of Automatic Can-
teen when it showed that petitioners knowingly received preferential price
treatment of such a nature as to violate Section 2.14
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing
methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or deliv-
ered.
12 346 U.S. at 79-80.
13 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1960).
14Id. at 228-29.
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Similarly in AMid-South Distributors v. FTC,5 the following factors were
held sufficient to establish a presumption of the buyer's knowledge of the
seller's nonjustification:
The outstanding factor is that as to a specific purchase order the partic-
ular Member-Jobber knew two things. First, the price he was obtaining
through the Co-op was substantially lower than his group (b) competitors
were required to pay. Second, for all practical purposes, the order and
shipment were handled exactly the same. It is true that the Member-Jobber
forwarded the order to the Supplier on a Co-op order form which osten-
sibly reflected a purchase of the goods for the Co-op. But this order form
showed that shipment was to be made to the specified Member-Jobber.
The buyer knew that this procedure represented no real savings in cost to
the seller. Invoices were, of course, sent by the Supplier to the Co-op
which was presumably liable therefor. But the Member-Jobber as buyer
knew that the volume discount was extended, not because of increased credit
reliability acquired by the presence of the Co-op as a sort of guarantor,
but solely because of the increased volume of total purchases. The buyer
could not reasonably have entertained any idea that he was getting preferred
treatment over his competitor because credit costs were less. Moreover,
there was no proof that this is why Suppliers were selling at more favorable
terms.16
Under its balance of convenience standard, though, the Court in Auto-
matic Canteen considered proof of knowledge that the seller's offer was
made to meet a competing offer more particularly within the province of
the buyer.17  In a footnote to its opinion the Court stated:
'5287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1961).
16ld. at 518. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Alhambra Motor Parts v. FTC, 309 F.2d
213 (9th Cir. 1962), however, indicates that cooperative buying would be upheld in respect to a
cooperative which conducted a cost saving warehouse and redistribution service (1) if the co-op
buying group were deemed a separate entity which as opposed to being a mere device to facili-
tate member jobber qualification for volume discounts as no price discrimination would exist
in that case between the warehousing co-op and the independent warehouse distributors which
both performed distribution functions and received the same redistribution discount, or; (2) if,
in any event the economies of the warehousing operation were sufficient to dispel any culpable
knowledge on the part of the member jobbers that the price discounts could not be justified.
Fe also American Metal Products Co., [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
15,684 at 20,514 (FTC 1962), dismissed by FTC as moot (June 8, 1962) (no competitive in-
jury to buyer's competitors in view of apparent cost justification and lack of evidence that favored
buyer used discounts to sell at lower price). But cf. National Parts Warehouse, [1963-1965
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 16,700 at 21,607 (FTC 1963) (injury to competitors of
buying group's jobber members postulated from member's price advantage over unaffiliated
jobbers, although not reflected in their resale prices).
17 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964). This section provides:
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that there
has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of re-
butting the prima fade case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the per-
son charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirma-
tively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimi-
nation: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller from
rebutting the prima fade case thus made by showing that his lower price on the fur-
nishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith
to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services, or facilities furnished by.
a competitor.
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Our view that § 2(b) permits consideration of conventional rules of
fairness and convenience of course requires application of those rules to the
particular evidence in question. Evidence, for example, that the seller's
price was made to meet a competing seller's offer to a buyer charged under
§ 2(f) might be available to a buyer more readily even than to a seller.' s
Until recently, this aspect of the Automatic Canteen opinion has received
little treatment. The Commission has acknowledged the Court's procedural
allocation, accepting the burden of presenting evidence as to the absence
of cost justification and the presence of probable competitive injury, but
has declared that it regards the burden with respect to the issues of "meet-
ing competition" and "changing conditions" to be upon the buyer. 9 The
Fifth Circuit, however, while upholding the Commission's cease and desist
order under § 2(f) against two buying cooperatives in its Mid-South Dis-
tributors opinion indicated that it regarded the burden to be on the Com-
mission with respect to § 2 (b) justification as well. ° The Court in Mid-
South Distributors also commented briefly upon appellants' substantive
contention that they were without actual knowledge that the official prices
were below those necessary to meet competition:
Even less need be said of the § 2(b) seller justification to meet compe-
tition. The Co-ops were not formed to give Suppliers an opportunity to
meet competition 'with other Suppliers. The Co-ops were formed to get
from Suppliers who were already committed to the volume rebate practices
the benefit of that competitive method for individual jobbers through the
pooling of orders. What was sought was not a benefit for one Supplier be-
cause individual jobbers could get a like advantage from another Supplier.
What was sought was a benefit which the individual jobbers at their volume
level could get from no one.21
The Commission's opinion in Beatrice Foods Co., 2 though, has pro-
duced a decision which already has begun to fulfill Frederick Rowe's pre-
diction that it will "almost certainly spawn further controversy and litiga-
tion." In that proceeding a majority of the Commission dismissed the
§ 2 (a) charges against Beatrice for price discrimination in favor of Kroger
and A & P. The prices quoted to A & P were found to have been both
short lived and justifiable under § 2(b), and in the one instance where a
concession of prolonged and substantial duration was made, the interstate
commerce jurisdictional requirement had not been met. While the price
concessions granted to Kroger were found to have substantial competitive
18 346 U.S. at 79.
19 National Parts Warehouse, [1963-1965 Transfer Binderl TRADE REG. REP. 1 16,700 at
21,607 (FTC 1963).
20 287 F.2d at 517.
211d. at 519.
22 1967 Trade Cas. 5 72,124 at 84,051 (9th Cir. 1967).
2 Rowe, New Developments Under the Ro.bnson-Patman Act, 26 Bus. LAw. 971, 973
(1971).
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impact, the "meeting competition" defense was held to be available to
Beatrice, notwithstanding the fact that the offered prices were actually be-
low those paid by Kroger's competition. Beatrice's good faith effort to
determine the competitive prices was held to be sufficient to bring it within
the § 2(b) justification.
The absolution of Beatrice, however, did not exonerate Kroger. Kroger
conveyed false information as to competitive offers, and their deception
was held to have induced a discrimination in violation of § 2(f). Under
these circumstances, Kroger could not avail itself of the § 2(b) defense
accorded to Beatrice. In the words of Commissioner Jones:
Here, Kroger was in a very powerful bargaining position because of its
size and importance to the dairies in the Charleston Division. This being
so, Mr. Casserly went beyond the bounds of permissible bargaining when
he falsely gave the impression that the original Broughton offer amounted
to a 20 per cent discount; when he told the Beatrice representatives that
their 71 cent offer was too high on that specific ground; when he first re-
jected their 68 cent offer and then indicated that their 66 cent offer was
'competitive' without having made any comparison of the bids; and when
he failed to convey any correct information about the price levels being
quoted by others. It is by reason of this conduct that Kroger took on the
risk of liability under the Robinson-Patman Act.
Kroger asserts that this means it cannot be liable if Beatrice is found to
have acted in good faith. We disagree. There may be instances in which a
buyer is insulated from liability by the seller's good faith but Automatic
Canteen does not hold that the buyer is always entitled to avail himself of
such a defense, nor does it compel such a result in the present situation.
Undoubtedly a buyer can accept an offer made to meet competition which
in fact does beat a competing offer if the buyer has done nothing to initiate
the price break in the first place, but to hold that a buyer can escape lia-
bility merely by inducing and accepting a second discriminatory offer which
meets an offer previously induced by the buyer would make a mockery of
Section 2(f).24
The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion authored by former Supreme Court
Justice Clark sitting by designation, affirmed in a decision handed down
this spring:
Kroger seizes upon this circumstance contending that as a matter of law
the discharge of Beatrice requires the acquittal of Kroger because there
cannot 'be a violation of section 2(f) without there being one under sec-
tion 2(a). While ordinarily this may be true-a matter we need not and
do not pass upon - it is not true under the peculiar circumstances here,
where Kroger was found by the Commission to have given "false price in-
formation" to Beatrice as to Broughton's competing bid which induced
Beatrice in perfect good faith to meet Broughton's equally low price.2
24 Beatrice Foods Co., [1967-70 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,045 at 21,312
(1969).
2GKroger Company v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372, 1374 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W.
3166 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971).
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The Commission has sought to follow up its victory in Beatrice in a
two-pronged attack upon a private label milk agreement between the A & P
and Borden companies.26 In tendering its bid to supply A & P stores in
the Chicago area with private label milk and other dairy products, Borden
had informed A & P that its offer was being made to meet competition
in the form of an existing offer or offers then in A & P's possession. In
its complaint the Commission alleges that A & P violated both § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act and § 2 (f) of the Robinson-Patman Act
in accepting Borden's offer without informing Borden that its offer was
substantially below those of other competitive bidders. Introduction of
private label milk at the prevailing retail prices which had been secured
at as much as 11 cents per gallon less than vendor labeled milk was further
alleged to constitute illegal price stabilization in violation of § 5, on the
grounds that the cost savings were not passed along to the consuming pub-
lic; failure of Borden to pass on at the wholesale level similar price re-
ductions to A & P's competitors in the Chicago area was similarly attacked
as an unfair competitive practice. Thus comparing the complaint to the
decision in the Kroger case it appears that the Commission by an approach
parallel to that of its sister agency, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, is seeking not only to proscribe misrepresentation but non-disclosure
as well.
"Trade experience," another consideration pertinent to establishing the
buyer's knowledge, was also recently discussed by the Ninth Circuit in
Texas Gulf-Sulphur Co. V. J. R. Simplot. 7 In its action for contract re-
scission, Texas Gulf alleged that Simplot had unlawfully induced the sul-
phur supply contract in violation of § 2(f). In refusing to grant rescis-
sion, the Court noted the absence of the following factors:
* . . (a) that Simplot did not request or suggest, nor did Texas Gulf state
or suggest that Texas Gulf should or would not give similar or as favorable
a transaction to any other customer or prospective customer .. . (b) that
there was no express or implied agreement that Texas Gulf would not ex-
tend to any of its customers any of the terms negotiated between Texas
Gulf and Simplot or that anyone else would receive any less favorable trans-
actions . . . (c) that Simplot merely attempted to obtain the best deal it
could consistent with market conditions, and did not directly or indirectly
attempt to obtain any advantage over any of its fertilizer competitors, or
any more favorable deal than its competitors, or did not attempt to obtain,
induce or receive any discrimination violative of the Robinson-Patman
Act... (d) that Simplot had no reasons to believe that Texas Gulf would
give less favorable terms to any other customer or would discriminate
against any customer .. . (e) that there was no reason why Texas Gulf
could not have granted the same terms and conditions to other customers
and that Texas Gulf was under no restraint with respect thereto . . .(f)
26 In re The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., FTC Doc. No. 8866, Oct. 18, 1971.
27 1969 Trade Cas. 5 72,975 at 87,816 (9th Cir. 1969).
[Vol. 32.
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
that the transactions in issue, including those with the alleged disfavored
customers were isolated and nonrecurring transactions, each negotiated in
the light of the particular needs of the parties and in response to market
conditions existing at the time each was negotiated and executed.28
Many of the factors focused upon in the Texas Gulf case are similar to those
found in the so-called "buyer cases" arising under § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. These cases, beginning with Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 9
have held that buyer-induced discrimination in allowances and services
which are not within the reach of § 2(f) are nonetheless "unfair methods
of competition" under the Federal Trade Commission Act.80
The Kroger decision in which the Court refused to regard a violation
by the seller as a condition precedent to finding buyer liability under §
2(f), and the Grand Union rationale of extending § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act to plug legislative "oversights"31 are of consider-
able doctrinal significance. It is submitted, however, that their real impact
lies in enabling the prosecution of a violation, as distinguished from the
proscription of additional business conduct. In Grand Union, there was
no question that § 2 (d) had been violated. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit stated: "The practice itself is dearly proscribed by § 2(d);
the novelty is solely in the application of § 5 to a buyer's knowing receipt
of unlawful payments. 32
In Kroger, the Court's denial of absolution to the buyer was expressly
predicated upon the fact that the conveyance of false information relating
to competitive bids induced the discrimination-not a startling conclu-
sion, in the sense that the seller, too, cannot invoke the § 2(b) defense
unless he meets a "good faith" standard. Moreover, as previously indi-
cated, while there are important considerations compelling more vigorous
enforcement of § 2 (f) , there are equally compelling reasons supporting
a policy which does not unduly restrict commercial bargaining. A con-
sistent line of Court opinions and commentary evidence a dear desire to
avoid the result of "burning down the house to cook the pig." In reject-
ing the Commission's position in Automatic Canteen, the Court stated:
Such a reading must be rejected in view of the effect it might have on
28 Id. at 87,284.
2 9 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
30 Giant Foods, Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1962); American News v. FTC,
300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962). See also ANTITRUST DEvELOPMENTS 1955-68: A SUPPLEMENT
TO REPORT op THE ATroRNxY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITE TO STUDY THE ANTi-
TRUST LAWS pt. IV, at 153, (1955); in Fred Meyer Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966)
buyer induced discriminations in allowances and services were held to be within reach of § 2(f).
Certiorari was denied on this issue. 386 U.S. 907 (1967).
31 See Rowe, New Developments Under the Robinson-Patnam Act, 26 Bus. LAW. 971, 974
(1971).
32 300 F.2d at 98.
33 See note 4 supra.
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that sturdy bargaining between buyer and seller for which scope was pre-
sumably left in the areas of our economy not otherwise regulated. 4
Similarly the Report of the Attorney General's Committee maintained:
Especially significant was the Court's recognition of the imperative ne-
cessity for preserving the legal freedom of buyers to engage in aggressive
bargaining over price as basic to effectively competitive distribution. In
markets characterized by sellers enjoying a significant degree of control
over price, the exertion of offsetting force by some large and aggressive
buyers bargaining for concessions can contribute materially to lower prices
for all. Not only is one reduction likely to spread; but each entering wedge
enhances the negotiating position of other traders who can insist on equal
concessions from the supplier with the ancient gambit of buying elsewhere
unless he accedes. And unless competition on the buyers' level is wholly
defunct, the ultimate consumer stands to benefit by lower prices. Legalistic
impediments to this normal bargaining process, we think, might well de-
prive the public of gains that under effective competition it has a right to
expec. 3 5
Kroger, too, drew this distinction:
Moreover, we find no support for the charge that the Commission's
holding places the 'buyer at his peril whenever he engages in price bar-
gaining. The use by the Commission of the "hard bargaining" language
as well as the failure of Kroger "to convey any correct information about
the price levels being quoted by others" is but a warning, not a command.
The controlling point here is not the "hard bargaining" nor the "price
levels" but the misrepresentation of the Broughton bid36
What then are those factors which invite § 2(f) condemnation and
how may a businessman avoid them? Bargaining is in large measure a
matter of personal style with some individuals preferring to state to the
potential vendor at the outset the terms and conditions which they seek
and aggressively bargain for them from that point, while others prefer
to offer little communication in anticipation that the seller in an unstruc-
tured situation will come in with a lower offer than if a "ball park" is
established for him. Whatever the technique, the buyer has in mind both
a figure which he desires and a figure at which he will do business; these
may be the same or different, depending on the circumstances. The im-
portant point is that neither must be palpably unjustifiable. In terms of
costs, the Court in Automatic Canteen recognized the elusiveness of cost
justification: "Proof of a cost justification being what it is, too often no
one can ascertain whether a price is cost-justified."3' The buyer, there-
fore, will not be required to establish a cost justification necessary to ex-
-4 346 U.S. at 73-74.
35 THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANIrTRUST LAWS
pt. IV, at 196 (1955).
36 Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372-78 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3166
(U.S. Oct. 12, 1971).
37 346 U.S. at 79.
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cuse a seller relying on the cost justification defense in a court or admin-
istrative proceeding. By the same token, however, Automatic Canteen
makes it equally dear that exoneration will be accorded only where the
methods by which the buyer is served or the quantities in which he pur-
chases are sufficiently different from those of his competitors as to warrant
the difference in price. Kroger further indicates that the buyer will be
held to a high standard of knowledge in respect to prevailing competitive
costs. To this end the buyer might well be advised to document the cost
savings produced by and accruing to him, both as an internal check and
as a means of corroboration. 8 The buyer should also avoid the entice-
ment of certain trade devices such as cumulative volume discounts which
do not produce cost savings and of "loss leaders" offered by sellers to
establish a bridgehead at a new account. 39
If the price to be met is that of the seller's competitor, the buyer may
wish to disclose written evidence of such price. Kroger does not compel
disclosure, but does hold that if the buyer chooses to disclose, he must
disclose fairly. If the Commission is successful in its suit recently filed
against A & P and Borden, disclosure may be required at least under the
circumstances where the seller expresses its offer in terms of meeting ex-
isting offers. Moreover, there is the further impression that the tech-
niques utilized in playing one supplier off against another will be subject
to closer scrutiny and that bargaining by means of non-factual persuasion
is risky.40
Finally, the buyer is prohibited from engaging in any form of anti-
competitive behavior which would preclude the seller from offering sub-
stantially the same terms to the buyer's competitor.
3 8 Rowe, How to Comply with Sections 2(c)-(f), Proceedings N.Y. State Bar Ass'n. Section.
On Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Symposium 124,138 (1957).
3 9 Often offers of this nature are made unsolicited. While no case has been decided involv-
ing receipt without solicitation, the wording of § 2(f) would appear to dearly condemn receipt
of a concession known to be illegal. Both Automatic Canteen and Grand Union, decided under
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, indicate such a disjunctive interpretation would be
proper in a § 2(f) proceedings. Thus, if a buyer feels that these circumstances might arise-
with a vendor, he may wish to structure the negotiations by stating a basis upon which he will
deal at the outset, thereby securing a price which, while not as low, is still advantageous and.
moreover not afoul of § 2(f).
4 0 Rowe, New Developments Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 26 Bus. LAw. 971, 973
(1971); Report of ABA Commission to Study the Federal Trade Commission 68 (September
15, 1969). Conversely, however, a buyer is not bound to accept seller protestation that a con-
cession would be violative of the Robinson-Patman Act which is not grounded in fact.
